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Introduction
Armed con ‡ict is often characterized by di¤erent forms of violence, e.g. political violence, ethnic violence and random violence (Davenport & Stam, 2009; Fearon & Laitin, 2003) .
Each form of violence is likely to be associated with excess mortality, although the a¤ected population might di¤er by ethnic a¢ liation, political color or socioeconomic characteristics.
Both from a historical point of view and for the sake of post-con ‡ict reconstruction and reconciliation, it is important to recognize the occurrence of di¤erent forms of violence and to evaluate their impact on (segments of) the population (Straus, 2007) . In addition, di¤erent forms of violence are likely to be associated with di¤erent underlying causes. Hence, any empirical study of the determinants of violence necessarily needs to start from the identi…cation and measurement of violence in its di¤erent forms.
However, it is more rule than exception that some events in a con ‡ict cycle receive more attention than others (Cramer, 2007) . For example, in the aftermath of con ‡ict, victims belonging to the conquering party are more likely to be heard and cared for than victims a¢ liated with the defeated parties. Furthermore, victims of indirect e¤ects of violence, such as the disruption of health services and refugee streams, may be less visible than direct victims of violence. Finally, areas that are relatively well accessible or areas in which large scale massacres took place may receive more and better news coverage compared to less accessible areas and areas where killings were dispersed. Using the case of Rwanda, this paper shows how one can achieve a more complete assessment of a con ‡ict cycle with a balanced coverage of its distinct dimensions by relying on widely available data, i.e. population census data, and commonly used data analysis techniques, including Principal Component Analysis (PCA), Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) and regression analysis.
This exercise is complementary to the recent explosion of studies that use spatial statistics for the study of the internal dynamics of armed con ‡icts, in particular civil wars. Examples include Buhaug & Gates (2002) , Murdoch & Sandler (2002) , Ward & Gleditsch (2002) , O'Loughlin (2004) , Buhaug & Lujala (2005) , Buhaug & Rod (2006) , Ralaigh & Urdal (2007) , Rustad et al. (2008) , and Raleigh & Hegre (2009) . These studies have highlighted the importance of geography in explaining the location of armed con ‡ict. For example, in Buhaug & Rod (2006) , a study on the spatial determinants of African civil wars, it is shown that the distance to the capital city, the distance to state borders, road density as well as the geographic concentration of minority ethnic groups play an important role in explaining the location of armed con ‡ict. Furthermore, it is argued that this role depends on the type of con ‡ict. For example, whereas open warfare and con ‡ict over state governance is more likely to be intense near the capital city and main roads, insurgency is favored by local characteristics that are often distant from the capital city and main roads, e.g. rough terrain, sparsely populated hinterland and cross-border sanctuaries.
As argued by Buhaug & Lujala (2005) , the explosion of this type of studies is largely made possible by new developments in GIS software as well as the increasing availability of accurate sub-national geographic data on battle events. One of the most widely used datasets is The Armed Con ‡ict dataset, which provides sub-national systematic information on the incidence and location of battle events by screening news reports, at times complemented with information on the number of battle deaths (Gledistch et al., 2002; Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007) . However, the currently available sub-national data on armed con ‡ict has two major shortcomings. Firstly, news reports may be biased. Although care is taken to select information from independent sources, it is entirely possible that measurement error exists due to di¤ering degrees of coverage of some regions or some forms of violence. Secondly, battle events are often only a fraction of the violence taking place and battle deaths only a fraction of the death toll in civil wars. As such, it is widely recognized that one-sided violence against civilians is frequently occurring in civil wars and that the indirect death toll of civil wars often far outnumbers the direct death toll. However, to the best of my knowledge, there is no systematic way to accurately measure the indirect death toll of armed con ‡ict, either within or across countries. And, while there are two datasets documenting the country level incidence of one-sided violence against civilians and mass killings, neither of these datasets provides sub-national information 1 .
Although establishing an absolute measure of the direct and indirect death toll of di¤erent forms of violence is out of reach of the currently available data, the exercise for Rwanda will show that it is possible to develop a relative sub-national measure of excess mortality that, by means of an analysis of its spatial distribution, allows insight into the relative importance of di¤erent dimensions of the con ‡ict cycle. The proposed method can be applied to other countries that experienced internal strife and hence can open new avenues for the sub-national study of armed con ‡ict.
The Rwandan con ‡ict cycle of the nineties included civil war, genocide, reprisal killings, (counter)insurgency (i.e. rural guerilla warfare) and a major refugee crisis. Civil war broke out in Rwanda at the end of 1990, when the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), a rebel army consisting mostly of Tutsi exiles, started launching attacks from Uganda. These …rst attacks were followed by a two-year period of intermittent hostilities and negotiations between the government and the RPF, which eventually led to a cease-…re in July 1992 and a power sharing agreement. But on April 6, 1994 the plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda was shot down. Thereafter, Rwanda sunk into chaos. Within hours, the military (FAR -Forces Armées Rwandaises), the Interahamwe militia 2 , administrators and ordinary people started to kill Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Simultaneously with the onset of genocide, the civil war between the FAR and the RPF restarted. In areas where the RPF "liberated" the population from the genocidal regime, the RPF allegedly engaged in reprisal killings of Hutu. Late in June 1994, the RPF took power and the massive killings came to an end.
However, until the late nineties, violence continued in the Northwest which was the locus of insurgency and counterinsurgency operations on the part of respectively the FAR+ (FAR and Interhamwe militia) -who used Congo as a basis for sporadic attacks, and the RPFwho remained military active close to and across the border with Congo in order to …ght the insurgents.
Among the events in the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle, the genocide has by far received most non-scholarly and scholarly attention. Many have tried to understand its causes and consequences from a political, social, anthropological, cultural or economic viewpoint (e.g. André & Platteau, 1998; Baines, 2003; Des Forges, 1999; Newbury, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Straus, 2004; Verpoorten & Berlage, 2007; Verwimp, 2005) . In addition, several e¤orts have been made to estimate the genocide's death toll among Tutsi (e.g. Prunier, 1998; Verpoorten, 2005) . Two recent scholarly publications give a more central role to the other forms of violence, including reprisal killings committed by the RPF and the spillover of violence to eastern Congo (Davenport & Stam, 2009 , Reyntjens, 2009 ). For several reasons, it is understandable that the genocide received most attention. First, an astonishingly large number of people were killed in a very short time period. Second, the ethnic cleansing campaign of Tutsi was partly executed by ordinary civilians. Third, some of the atrocities committed were of the most extreme brutality one can imagine. Fourth, a clear, large-scale and brutal crime against humanity occurred in front of the public eye without spurring an intervention of the international community. However, a less justi…able reason also plays a role. The western failure to halt the genocidal slaughter left the international community with a legacy of guilt, resulting in donors piling in aid and turning a blind eye to human rights violations committed by the conquering party (the RPF). Consequently, while the new RPF-led Rwandan government organized up to three di¤erent surveys to count the victims and survivors of the genocide (Government of Rwanda, 2008) , imprisoned more than 100,000 alleged genocide perpetrators and put in place community level tribunals for judging them, no such e¤orts were taken to do justice to victims of other forms of violence.
The lack of an open debate on all forms of violence makes it di¢ cult to collect equally accurate information on the di¤erent types of violence and assess their relative impact on the population. However, this paper aims to do just that. Relying on both the 1991 and 2002 population census, I construct a detailed spatial pattern of wartime excess mortality by subjecting a series of excess mortality proxies (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) di¤erences in sector level mortality of sons and daughters, widowhood and orphanhood, and 2002 disability due to armed con ‡ict) to principal component analysis. The …rst principal component provides us with a wartime excess mortality index (WEMI) on a less to more scale for approximately 1,500 administrative sectors, which are, after the cell, the lowest administrative units in Rwanda with an average population size of about 5,000 inhabitants 3 . The signi…cance of local geographic concentration in excess mortality is assessed by Local Indicators of Spatial Association -LISA (Anselin, 2005) . In a regression analysis, the spatial pattern of excess mortality is related to the location and size of refugee camps as well as to the spatial determinants of di¤erent forms of violence (e.g. distance to Kigali City, the RPF advancement, distance to a main road, the geographic concentration of Tutsi, the location of alleged extrajudicial killings).
The spatial pattern reveals signi…cant high-high excess mortality clusters in some (but not all) provinces a¤ected by the 1994 genocide, as well as in the East, which was the location of heavy …ghting between the FAR+ and the RPF in 1994. Moreover, I provide the …rst quantitative evidence of high excess mortality in the Northwest. This area was not only the place of alleged severe human rights violations on the part of the RPF and FAR+ during the 1995-1998 (counter)insurgency, but it also served as the corridor for approximately one million refugees. The results of the regression analysis indicate that both the (counter)insurgency and the refugee crisis contributed to high excess mortality in the Northwest.
The next section gives an overview of previous assessments of the death toll of the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle. In section 3, I calculate a measure for wartime excess mortality on a less to more scale for approximately 1,500 administrative sectors in Rwanda. Section 4 illustrates and discusses the spatial pattern of excess mortality. Using regression analysis, Section 5 establishes a relationship between the spatial pattern of excess mortality and a set of distinct spatial determinants that are associated with the di¤erent events in the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle. Section 6 concludes.
2 The death toll of the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1998 , the Gersony report 5 ).
In contrast to the relatively detailed documentation of the 1994 death toll, the documentation of the death toll of the 1990-1993 civil war and 1995-1998 (counter) insurgency is much scarcer. The UCDP/PRIO battle deaths database details the number of battle deaths in Rwanda for the period 1990 , with important omissions for 1994 , 1995 (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007 . Starting at 2,000 battle deaths in 1990, the number increases to 3,200 in 1991 3,200 in and 1992 3,200 in , and drops to 1,600 in 1993 3,200 in . In 1997 3,200 in and 1998 and 6,000 battle deaths are counted. In 1999 the number of battle deaths does not exceed 1,000 which means an end to civil war according to the de…nition used 6 . The UCDP/PRIO data is not well suited for assessing the intensity of violence in Rwanda, not only because data is lacking for 1994-1996, but also because violence against civilians, which was by far the most important form of violence in Rwanda, is largely omitted (Restrepo et al., 2006) .
According to accounts of Amnesty International, in the course of 1995-1998, a large number of Rwandan civilians became victims of the intensifying con ‡ict between the RPF and armed opposition groups believed to be allied to the former FAR+. Both parties are accused of severe human rights violations and large-scale massacres among civilians, taking place mainly in the Northwest of the country. However, most of the alleged massacres cannot be investigated because of the Rwandan Government's tight control on the dissemination of information relating to the human rights situation. The accounts of killings therefore remain tentative and incomplete. Amnesty International has probably provided the most complete coverage in four reports with …tting titles "Alarming resurgence of killings", "Civilians trapped in armed con ‡ict", "Ending the silence" and "The hidden violence: disappearances and killings continue" (Amnesty International, 1996 , 1997a , 1997b .
Besides the high direct death toll of the Rwandan armed con ‡ict, many may have died 5 The "Gersony Report" is the name given to an unpublished report that identi…ed a pattern of massacres by the RPF. The …ndings in the report were made by a team under Robert Gersony under contract to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Gersony's personal conclusion was that between April and August 1994, the RPF had killed "between 25,000 and 45,000 persons, between 5,000 and 10,000 persons each month from April through July and 5,000 for the month of August" (Des Forges, 1999) . 6 Civil war is de…ned as a war between organized groups within a single nation state having more than 1,000 battle deaths in a single year prematurely following the collapse of health care, social and economic systems in the midnineties 7 . Furthermore, the death toll in refugee camps was very high due to the rapid spread of infectious diseases. For example, the cholera epidemic in Goma (at the border of RD Congo and Rwanda) is believed to have taken around 30,000 lives (Prunier, 1998) . The indirect death toll in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri may have been higher than elsewhere because these northwestern provinces did not only serve as the corridor of approximately one million refugees ‡eeing to Congo in 1994 and back to Rwanda in 1996/1997, but they also experienced a relatively long period of violence as well as important disruptions in economic activities. In this respect, Amnesty International reports that, as part of the counterinsurgency strategy, a scorched earth policy was being carried out in many areas in the Northwest, where homes and …elds were being burned. In addition, they report that, in an attempt to cut food supplies to armed opposition groups, the RPF prevented farmers from harvesting and marketing their crops (Amnesty International, 1997a).
3 Identifying wartime excess mortality I follow a long standing tradition in the demographic literature to infer excess mortality from characteristics of the surviving population, a method referred to as indirect mortality estimation (Hill & Trussel, 1997; Timaeus, 1986) . However, instead of aiming at the usual absolute countrywide estimate of excess mortality, the proposed method focuses on capturing relative excess mortality and its spatial distribution within one country.
Mortality proxies
I derive …ve sector level mortality proxies (M P -(M P 1) Mortality of sons: total number of boys died/number of boys born (for all women who ever gave birth); 7 There are very few accounts on the indirect death toll of the Rwandan armed con ‡ict. However, the International Rescue Commitee (IRC) has tried to assess the impact of war in DR Congo on excess mortality. Based on several national mortality censuses, they report that "Less than 10 percent of deaths were directly attributable to violence. The vast majority of Congolese died from the indirect public health e¤ects of con ‡ict, including higher rates of infectious diseases, increased prevalence of malnutrition and complications arising from neonatal-and pregnancy-related conditions" (Roberts et al., 2007 ).
-(M P 2) Mortality of daughters: total number of girls died/girls born (for all women who ever gave birth);
-(M P 3) Widowhood: the proportion of widows among women (>=30 years);
-(M P 4) Double orphanhood: the proportion of double orphans among children and youngsters (<30 years);
-(M P 5) Disability: the proportion of the population reporting a handicap due to war or genocide.
(M P 1) (M P 4) may pick up sector level variation in mortality caused by factors other than the intensity of violence, i.e. peacetime characteristics (e.g. climate or health infrastructure). More formally, the variation in M P ij (i = 1 4) across sectors j (j = 1 1544) is not only explained by direct and indirect wartime e¤ects of violence, V j , but also by peacetime sector level characteristics, P j . Aiming to capture only the variation due to V j , I take the difference between M P ij and baseline mortality proxies, M P 0 ij , taken from the 1991 population census. Due to data limitations, the baseline mortality proxies are de…ned at the commune level instead of the sector level. The commune still is a very small administrative unit, with an average size of 174 squared km and counting on average only 5.8 sectors. Summary statistics for M P ij and M P 0 ij ; as well as their …rst di¤erences (M P ij M P 0 ij ), denoted M P ij , are reported in Table 1 . It is noteworthy that I …nd strong evidence for high wartime excess mortality: compared to 1991, the 2002 mortality proxies of sons and daughters are higher by eight and six percentage points respectively, the proportion of widows increased by 13 percentage points (from 0.18 to 0.31) and the proportion of double orphans more than doubled (from 0.02 to 0.05).
----------Insert Table 1 about here ----------An important note to make is that the aftermath of the Rwandan con ‡ict was characterized by a huge refugee crisis and considerable internal and external migration. 
Wartime Excess Mortality Index (WEMI)
The challenge is to aggregate the information embodied in the …ve wartime excess mortality proxies ( M P 1 M P 5) into a meaningful index of wartime excess mortality. To overcome arbitrariness and safeguard maximum variation, several studies have persuasively argued for the use of principal component analysis (PCA) (Hibbs, 1973; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; Alesina & Perotti, 1996) . PCA has the desirable property of reducing the dimensionality of a data set while retaining as much as possible of the variation present in the data set.
More precisely, from a set of variables, PCA extracts orthogonal linear combinations that capture the common information in the set most successfully. The …rst principal component (PC) identi…es the linear combination of the variables with maximum variance, the second principal component yields a second linear combination of the variables, orthogonal to the …rst, with maximal remaining variance, and so on 8 .
For our objective, i.e. de…ning an index of excess mortality, we are interested in the …rst PC, which will be an appropriate summary of excess mortality if it captures a relatively high percentage of the total variance present in the excess mortality proxies set and the "loadings"
8 Formally, suppose that x is a vector of p random variables and x is a vector of the standardized p variables, having zero mean and unit variance, then the …rst principal component P C1 is the linear function 0 1 x having maximum variance, where 1 is a vector of p constants 11; a12; :::; 1p and 0 denotes transpose. which explains up to 57% of the total variation of the variable set ( M P 1 M P 5) and has signi…cant loadings on all excess mortality proxies.
Robustness checks
I perform several robustness tests to check the sensitivity of W EM I to the inclusion of alternative excess mortality proxies. First, WEMI is calculated including migrants, which results in very similar factor loadings and an index denoted W EM I mi . Second, I calculate the 2002 mortality proxies (M P 1) (M P 5) at the commune level instead of the sector level. Then I proceed as above, taking …rst di¤erences using the commune level 1991 excess mortality proxies. Third, in order to attenuate the e¤ect of survival bias on W EM I, I
increase the weight of sectors that are close to sites of large-scale massacres. In these sites, the probability that entire families were exterminated is likely to be relatively high, causing mortality inferred from the surviving population to be under-reported. The proximity to a large-scale massacre is taken into account by adding the natural logarithm of the distance to the nearest mass grave to the set of variables subjected to PCA. This distance is calculated in km at the sector level by overlaying a geo-referenced administrative map with the location of 71 mass graves in Rwanda taken from the Yale Genocide Studies website.
The resulting …rst principal components for these robustness checks are given by the following linear combinations: demonstrate that all four indices yield the same qualitative results. Besides these robustness checks, I also performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to the age limits for the excess mortality proxies M P 3 and M P 4, and I …nd that setting the age limits 5 years lower (at 25) or 5 years higher (at 35) does not alter the qualitative results (not reported).
4 The spatial pattern of wartime excess mortality
The …rst two columns of Table 2 list the average of W EM I and its ranking across provinces.
To facilitate the interpretation of the index, its values are rescaled to …t the interval [0; 1] :
Gisenyi has the largest value for W EM I, followed by Kibungo, Kigali City and Butare.
Cyangugu scores lowest, followed by Gikongoro and Byumba. How do these di¤erences in ranking relate to the location of di¤erent forms of violence?
The last three columns of Table 2 give a qualitative assessment of the intensity of genocide, civil war and (counter)insurgency for each province. This information is taken from a study by Justino & Verwimp (2006) ----------
Insert Table 2 about here
The province level averages may hide important di¤erences within provincial borders. Concomitantly, the low-low clusters are also identi…ed (Anselin, 1995) .
More formally, LISA provides a measure of the extent to which the arrangement of values around a speci…c location deviates from spatial randomness. A general expression of a LISA statistic for a variable y i , observed at location i, is:
where f is a function expressing the correlation between y i and y J i , and y J i are the values observed in the neighborhood J i of location i. The speci…c LISA statistic I use is the local Moran statistic for an observation i:
with w ij a spatial weighting matrix indicating the relevant neighbors for the LISA analysis.
The weighting matrix w ij can be de…ned in di¤erent ways, although contiguity-based de…n-itions are by far mostly used. I use a …rst order rook-contiguity based weighting matrix for neighbors, where w ij equals one for sectors with a common boundary and zero otherwise.
By looking explicitly at areas instead of individual sectors, I can to a large extent avoid wrong classi…cation of erroneous outliers. Arbitrariness in identifying "high" is avoided by assessing the signi…cance of high-high clusters. The procedure employed to assess statistical signi…cance relies on a Monte Carlo simulation of di¤erent arrangements of the data and the construction of an empirical distribution of simulated statistics. Afterwards the value obtained originally is compared to the distribution of simulated values and, if the value exceeds the 95 th percentile, it is said that the relation found is signi…cant at 5%.
----------Insert Fig. 1 about here Figure 2 depicts the locations with signi…cant high-high (dark grey) and signi…cant lowlow clusters (light grey). I note a rather large low-low cluster that covers parts of Cyangugu, western Gikongoro and southern Kibuye. In order to explain this low-low cluster, two di¤er-ent arguments can be made. First, it can be veri…ed that the low-low cluster covers the parts of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Kibuye that are characterized by a relatively low proportion of Tutsi: 6.7%, 5.8% and 7.7% respectively compared to 15.5%, 18.1% and 13.3% for the areas of Cyangugu, Gikongoro and Kibuye that are not covered by the low-low cluster. Second, from 4 July 1994 until 22 August 1994, the French intervention "Opération Turquoise" set up a "safe zone" in the triangle Cyangugu -southern Kibuye -western Gikongoro. However, the intervention was heavily criticized, among others for not demilitarizing the zone and for serving other than humanitarian purposes, and it is estimated that it saved (only) 15,000 to 17,000 lives 9 .
In order to gauge the relative importance of the two explanations, I will revert to multivariate analysis in the subsequent section. Besides, an additional factor that needs to be taken into account is the large in ‡ow and out ‡ow of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
following respectively the start and end of Opération Turquoise. It is estimated that when Opération Turquoise ended on 22 August, some 390,000 IDPs remained in 33 camps. The forced closures of these remaining camps took place between August 1994 and April 1995 and was allegedly accompanied with severe human rights violation. It is by now well documented that, in the case of the closure of Kibeho in mid-April 1995, a massacre took place among the IDP population with estimates ranging between 2,000-5,000 dead (Prunier, 1998) . The IDP camp in Kibeho was located in Gikongoro Province, close to the borderline between the safe zone and the zone controlled by the RPF (see Figure 3) . It was the largest camp within Rwanda, spreading nine square kilometers and containing between 80,000 and 100,00
people. In the multivariate analysis below, I include an indicator variable for the location of the camp in order to isolate its impact on excess mortality from the other variables of interest. Unfortunately, no data is available on the location of the smaller IDP camps.
The signi…cant high-high clusters in Figure 2 con…rm the pattern detected from Table   2 and Figure 1 : Butare, Kigali (both City and Rural), Kibungo and Gisenyi stand out, 9 The estimates are from the French army itself. According to Des Forges (1999) the number of lives saved by 2,500 well-equipped elite French forces -15,000 to 17,000 -is low compared to the achievements of the barely 500 U.N. peacekeepers, who were poorly equipped and minimally supplied, but protected about twice that number during the course of the genocide. However, this comparison does not take into account the di¤erence in duration between the very short French intervention and the longer U.N. intervention. while smaller high-high clusters can be found in parts of Ruhengeri, Umutara, Gikongoro, Gitarama and Kibuye. It is noteworthy that the high-high cluster detected in southeastern Gikongoro coincides with the location of the Kibeho IDP camp. However, Kibeho is also located in the commune (Mubuga) with the highest share of Tutsi (57% compared to an average of 8%), a fact that may as well account for the high-high cluster. To complete the description of the spatial pattern, I note that W EM I is characterized by global clustering, i.e. the general trend is one of clustering with a rather high value for Moran's I (0.63) indicating signi…cant positive spatial autocorrelation (Moran, 1950) .
5 Spatial analysis of excess mortality
Spatial determinants
Now that I have established a detailed spatial pattern of excess mortality in Rwanda, I seek to understand how this pattern relates to the di¤erent events of the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle.
To this end I identify a set of spatial determinants that are associated with the four major events in the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle, i.e. civil war, genocide, (counter)insurgency and the refugee crisis:
1. Civil war started in 1990, in the North of Rwanda at the border with Uganda. In 1994, the RPF moved eastwards to make a circular movement around the capital, Kigali City, which it eventually took over (Davenport & Stam, 2009 ). Thus, a relevant spatial determinant for civil war is the distance to the capital city. Besides, since much of the 1990-1994 civil war was open warfare, its intensity is also likely to be higher near main roads (Buhaug & Rod, 2006) . In addition, I construct a …ne measure to capture the RPF advancement. Relying on information about the location of the RPF-FAR+ battle-front in Rwanda provided by the genodynamics project 10 , I construct a categorical variable that takes on values equal to the number of days that the sector was under RPF control between the start and the end of the 1994 RPF advancement (a 109-day period, i.e. April, 1, 1994 -July, 19, 1994 (Verpoorten, 2005) . A suitable determinant for the intensity of genocide is the commune-level proportion of Tutsi in 1991, which is calculated based on a 10% sample of the 1991 population census (provided by Minnesota Population Center, 2010). In addition, the distance to Kigali may also be related to the intensity of the genocide, because the ethnic cleansing was orchestrated by the central administration and gradually spread from the capital city to the countryside.
3. The refugee crisis was nationwide, but more intense at the borders with RD Congo and Tanzania, two neighboring countries that hosted an estimated 1,200,000 and 580,000 refugees, respectively. Burundi also hosted a considerable number of refugees (270,000) while Uganda hosted no more than 10,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2000) . Both the proximity of a refugee camp and its size are likely to a¤ect excess mortality. Therefore, besides including the distance to the nearest camp, I distinguish between the distance to a small camp (1,000-25,000), a medium camp (50,000-100,000 refugees) and the distance to a large camp (>=250,000). However, since the Northwest (in particular Gisenyi) also served as a corridor for massive refugee streams, I need to add a …ner variable that re ‡ects the intensity of counterinsurgency within the northwestern provinces. To this end, I compile information on the number and location of alleged extrajudicial killings of civilians during (counter)insurgency from four Amnesty international reports (Amnesty International, 1996 , 1997a , 1997b . This information is used to construct a commune level proxy for the intensity of (counter)insurgency within the northwestern provinces.
Finally, two additional variables enter the analysis. First, I include an indicator variable taking 1 for 139 northern administrative sectors that were already under RPF control during the civil war of the early 1990s, and zero otherwise. This is to account for the fact that the civil war started o¤ in October 1990, which is a couple of months prior to the implementation of the August 1991 population census. Hence, the baseline excess mortality proxies, M P 0 ij , may be biased upward for the northern sectors. Second, I include an indicator variable taking 1 for the 205 sectors that made up the safe zone of Opération Turquoise, and zero otherwise.
All distance variables are calculated at the sector level using GeoDa (Anselin, 1995) . Table 3 provides summary statistics. Figure 3 provides an administrative map of Rwandan provinces with indications of borders with neighboring countries, the location of main roads, the location of the Kibeho IDP camp, the safe zone under Opération Turquoise, the 1990 civil war zone and the refugee camps across the borders with neighboring countries. I count four large refugee camps hosting as many as 250,000 refugees. Three of these refugee camps were located at the northwestern border with Congo (near Goma), while one was located close to the southeastern border with Tanzania. Each of these locations was also hosting a medium size refugee camp (50,000 -100,000 refugees). In addition, there were seven camps of about 25,000 refugees, of which four were located close to the southwestern border with Congo (near Uvira and Bukavu). Finally, almost all of the 34 remaining small refugee camps -hosting between 1,000 and 10,000 refugees -were located in Burundi and across the southwestern border with Congo, near Uvira and Bukavu. In Figure 3 , I only display the three small camps that are relevant for the analysis, i.e. those which are the nearest refugee camp for at least one Rwandan sector -for the other 31 small camps one can …nd a medium sized or large refugee camp that is closer to the border (UNHCR, 2000).
----------Insert Table 3 
Regression analysis
The dependent variable for the regression analysis is the wartime excess mortality index W EM I (rescaled to …t the interval 0-1). Since W EM I is derived from PCA its interpretation is rather cumbersome. Therefore, I provide a second set of results with an alternative dependent variable, i.e. an absolute sector level death toll derived from W EM I. The derivation is straightforward once I make an assumption on the total nationwide death toll of the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle. For example, assuming a nationwide death toll of 1,000,000 or an average sector level death toll of 648, the death toll for each sector can be derived from W EM I j as follows:
One can easily perform a sensitivity analysis with alternative death toll estimates. For example, assuming a nationwide death toll of 1,500,000, the estimated coe¢ cients of the regression analysis should be multiplied by 1.5. To put the absolute death toll in perspective, note that the 1994 Rwandan population amounted to approximately 8.6 million, with an average of about 5,300 inhabitants per sector.
The aim is to test whether all four main events in the Rwandan con ‡ict cycle contribute to explaining the observed spatial pattern in excess mortality. To this end, I formulate testable hypotheses for each of the events by relying on their association with distinct spatial determinants. This approach yields the following set of hypotheses:
Civil war
H1a: the number of days under RPF control is positively associated with excess mortality H1b: distance from the nearest main road is negatively associated with excess mortality H1c: distance from Kigali City is negatively associated with excess mortality
Genocide
H2a: the 1991 commune-level proportion of Tutsi in the population is positively associated with excess mortality H2b: distance from Kigali City is negatively associated with excess mortality
Refugee crisis
H3a: distance from the nearest refugee camp is negatively associated with excess mortality H3b: the larger the refugee camp, the stronger its association with excess mortality H3c : sectors close to the largest IDP camp have a relatively large excess mortality
Counter(-insurgency)
H4a: location within Gisenyi or Ruhengeri is positively associated with excess mortality
H4b: the number of alleged extrajudicial killings is positively associated with excess mortality Table 4 reports the main results of the regression analysis with W EM I j as the dependent variable. Model 1 is the most parsimonious speci…cation. It includes only the variables associated with the hypotheses above (except for H3b which is the subject of subsection 5.3) without additional controls. I …nd that only two hypotheses are not supported by the data, H1b and H3c, since the coe¢ cients on the variables Distance_to_main_road and Kibeho_10km are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. As argued above, Kibeho sector was the site of a massacre among the population of an IDP camp but also hosted the largest share of Tutsi in its population, which causes a severe multicollinearity problem. When dropping T utsi_% from the regression, the estimated coe¢ cient on Kibeho_10km is 0.136 and highly signi…cant (not reported). The other estimated coe¢ cients are in line with the hypotheses that excess mortality increases with RP F _days, T utsi_%, Executions_in_N orthwest;
decreases with Distance_to_main_road and Distance_to_nearest_RC; and is higher in the Northwestern provinces Gisenyi and Ruhengeri:
These qualitative results remain throughout Models 2-5 for which the set of explanatory variables is gradually expanded to include Op eration_T urquoise, RP F _1990, P opulation_density_1991
and U rban. The results for these additional control variables are in itself interesting: the estimated impact of Op eration_T urquoise on excess mortality is negative and signi…cant in Models 2 and 3 suggesting that the operation was at least partially successful; the estimated coe¢ cients on RP F _1990 indicate that the WEMI is lower in areas that were already occupied by the RPF during the early civil war which re ‡ects the upward bias on the baseline mortality proxies; WEMI is found to be lower in urban areas and to increase with P opulation_density_1991, a …nding that is in line with the often made hypothesis that land scarcity plays an important role in explaining violence in Rwanda (Prunier, 1998; André & Platteau, 1998) . Model 6 indicates that all of these results, except for the signi…cantly positive coe¢ cient on RPF_days, are robust to including province …xed e¤ects.
----------Insert Table 4 about here ---------- Table 5 repeats the results of Table 4 , but taking deathtoll j as the dependent variable, which provides us with a more tangible interpretation for the estimated coe¢ cients. For example, assuming an average of 648 dead in a sector, the estimated additional death toll in the provinces experiencing counterinsurgency, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, vary between respectively 186-232 and 114-152 across the six di¤erent models. Furthermore, within these provinces, for every additional 1000 alleged extrajudicial executions within a commune, which corresponds to an average of 90 alleged extrajudicial executions within a sector, a sector's death toll is estimated to increase with 42-50 11 . A tenfold reduction (e.g. from 10 km to 1 km or from 100 km to 10 km) in the distance to a refugee camp increases the death toll with 40 to 66. A 10 percentage point higher pre-genocide Tutsi population corresponds with an additional 67-81 dead. A tenfold reduction in the distance to Kigali increases the estimated death toll by 95-158. Finally, an additional day under RPF control leads to an 8 to 24 unit increase in the death toll. Although these coe¢ cient estimates are indicative for the impact of the di¤erent forms of violence and the refugee crisis, their absolute values should be taken with caution, due to the unveri…ed assumption of a one million nationwide death toll and multicollinearity between the explanatory variables.
----------
Insert Table 5 about here
Accounting for the refugee crisis & other robustness checks
In column 1 of Table 6 , I repeat the baseline results of Table 4 , column 1. In the remaining columns, I contrast this result with several speci…cations in order to gauge the impact of displacement and resettlement on the results. First, in column 2, I distinguish between refugee camps of di¤erent sizes by replacing the variable Distance_to_nearest_RC by three distinct variables: Distance_to_small_RC, Distance_to_medium_RC and Distance_to_large_RC.
The results indicate that distance to a small camp has no signi…cant impact on excess mortality, whereas the other two distance variables take on a strongly negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient, with the coe¢ cient for distance from a large camp twice as large in absolute value. This is evidence in support of H3b.
In the remaining columns, I replace the dependent variable W EM I by W EM I mi , i.e.
the index that includes the indivduals that changed residence between 1991 and 2002 ("the migrants"). This is interesting for two reasons. First, doing so, it can be veri…ed whether the coe¢ cients on the other variables remain unchanged, and hence whether possible omitted variable bias (from migration) is driving the results. The results in column 3 con…rm that all …ndings remain basically the same. Secondly, it is now possible to check whether sectors with a large migrant population are characterized by lower or higher wartime excess mortality.
In column 4, I add migrants_% to the set of explanatory variables and …nd no signi…cant Finally, the regressions are repeated using W EM I com and W EM I mg as dependent variables. All results remain qualitatively the same (not reported), but it is noteworthy that, in the case of the W EM I adjusted for survival bias (W EM I M G ) the coe¢ cient on T utsi_% increases in absolute value (by almost 10%), which strokes with the idea that survival bias is larger for the genocide because many Tutsi families were entirely exterminated.
----------Insert Table 6 about here ----------
Conclusion
Measuring internal violence is not only about observed battle events and battle deaths. Other aspects are important such as one-sided violence against civilians, hidden battle events and the indirect death toll. Yet, due to lack of systematic data, these other aspects have gone largely unstudied in existing sub-national studies. This is clearly a shortcoming, the more so because their spatial distribution is unlikely to be uniform across a country's territory. Hence, failing to identify and measure them not only limits our insights of the internal dynamics of con ‡ict cycles, but may also hinder our understanding of battle events because of important omitted variable bias.
The challenge taken in this study is to provide a more balanced view of a con ‡ict cycle through a sub-national spatial analysis of excess mortality. The illustration focused on Rwanda where, during the nineties, a sequence of di¤erent interrelated events occurred:
civil war, genocide, reprisal killings, a massive refugee crisis and (counter)insurgency. The ,2000) and with a map of the genodynamics project that gives information on the position of the RPF and Opération Turquoise; in total , there are 34 small camps (1,000-10,000), but I only display the three small camps that are relevant for the analysis, i.e. those which are the closest refugee camp for at least one Rwandan sector. The other 31 camps are located further from the border or at least as far as a larger refugee camp. Figure 4 : number of alleged 1995-1998 extrajudicial killings of civilians for administrative communes located in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi Note: own compilation by plotting information on alleged extrajudicial killings from four Amnesty International reports (Amnesty International 1996 , 1997a , 1997b on an administrative map of Rwanda. Justino and Verwimp (2006) use event data for their qualitative assessment of the location of genocide, civil war and (counter-)insurgency; they do not provide a seperate assessment for Kigali City and Umutara Province, a province which was created only after 1994 by joining parts of Kibungo and Byumba. The dependent variable is an estimate for the absolute sector level death toll, derived from WEMI, assuming a total nationwide death toll of 1 million. 
